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Abstract   
According to the traditional conception of the mind, semantical content is per-
haps the most important feature distinguishing mental from non-mental systems. 
And this traditional conception has been incorporated into the foundations of 
contemporary scientific approaches to the mind, insofar as the notion of ‘mental 
representation’ is adopted as a primary theoretical device. Symbolic representa-
tions are posited as the internal structures that carry the information utilized by 
intelligent systems, and they also comprise the formal elements over which cog-
nitive computations are performed. But a fundamental tension is built into the 
picture -  to the extent that  symbolic ‘representations’ are formal elements of 
computation, their alleged content is completely gratuitous. I argue that the com-
putational paradigm is thematically inconsistent with the search for content or its 
supposed ‘vehicles’. Instead, the concern of computational models of cognition 
should be with the processing structures that yield the right kinds of input/output 
profiles, and with how these structures can be implemented in the brain.
1.  THE COMPUTATIONAL PARADIGM
According to the traditional conception of the mind, semantical content is 
perhaps the most important feature distinguishing mental from non-mental 
systems.  For  example,  in  the  scholastic  tradition  revived  by  Brentano 
(1874), the essential feature of mental states is their ‘aboutness’ or intrinsic 
representational aspect. And this traditional conception has been incorpor-
ated  into  the  foundations  of  contemporary  scientific  approaches  to  the 
mind,  insofar  as  the  notion  of  ‘mental  representation’  is  adopted  as  a 
primary theoretical device. For example, in classical (e.g. Fodorian) cog-
nitive science, Brentano’s legacy is preserved in the view that the properly 
cognitive level is distinguished precisely by appeal to representational con-
tent. There are many different levels of description and explanation in the 
natural world, from quarks all the way to quasars, and according to Fodor, 
it is only when the states of a system are treated as representational that we 
are dealing with the genuinely cognitive level. 
The classical  paradigm in cognitive  science  derives  from Turing’s 
basic model of computation as rule governed transformations on a set of 
syntactical elements, and it has taken perhaps its most literal form of ex-
pression in terms of Fodor’s Language of Thought hypothesis (Fodor 1975, 
2008)  (henceforward  LOT),  wherein  mental  processes  are  explicitly 
viewed as formal operations on a linguistically structured system of intern-
al symbols. So in the present discussion I will use the LOT as a very clear 
exemplar of the classical approach, although the basic points generalize far 
beyond Fodor. According to the LOT, propositional attitude states, such as 
belief and desire, are treated as computational relations to sentences in an 
internal processing language, and where the LOT sentence serves to rep-
resent or encode the propositional content of the intentional state. Symbol-
ic representations are thus posited as the internal structures that carry the 
information  utilized  by  intelligent  systems,  and  they  also  comprise  the 
formal  elements  over  which  cognitive  computations  are  performed.  Ac-
cording to the traditional and widely accepted belief-desire framework of 
psychological  explanation,  an  agent’s  actions  are  both  caused and  ex-
plained by intentional  states such as belief and desire.  And on the LOT 
model, these states are sustained via sentences in the head that are formally 
manipulated by the cognitive processes which lead to actions. 
Fodor notes that particular tokens of these LOT sentences could well 
turn out to be specific neuronal configurations or brain states. The formal 
syntax of LOT thus plays a crucial triad of roles: it can represent meaning, 
it’s the medium of cognitive computation, and it can be physically realized. 
So the syntax of LOT can in principle supply a link between the high level 
intentional description of a cognitive agent, and the actual neuronal process 
that enjoy causal power. This triad of roles allows content bearing states, 
such as propositional attitudes, to explain salient pieces of behavior, such 
as bodily motions, if the intermediary syntax is seen as realized in neuro-
physiological configurations of the brain. Because the tokens of LOT are 
semantically interpretable and physically realizable, they form a key theor-
etical bridge between content and causation. In this manner, a very elegant 
(possible)  answer  is supplied to the longstanding theoretical  question of 
how mental  states individuated in terms of their content,  such as beliefs 
and desires, could be viewed as causes of actual behaviour, without violat-
ing fundamental conservation laws in physics.  
So  at  first  sight,  this  computational  approach  to  cognition  might 
seem to provide a compelling and harmonious theory of the mind/brain, 
potentially uniting the traditional notion of mental representation with the 
causally efficacious level of neural machinery. But alas, a fundamental ten-
sion  is  already built  into  the picture:  a  central  purpose  of the  symbolic 
structures is to carry content, and yet, to the extent that they are formal ele-
ments of computation, their alleged content is completely gratuitous. Com-
putation is essentially a series of manipulations performed on uninterpreted 
syntax, and formal structure alone is sufficient for all effective procedures. 
The  specification  and operation  of  such  procedures  makes  no reference 
whatever to the intended meaning of the symbols involved. Indeed, it is 
precisely this limitation to syntactic  form that has enabled computation to 
emerge as a mathematically rigorous discipline. If syntax alone is not suffi-
cient, and additional understanding or interpretation is required,  then the 
procedure in question is, by definition,  not an effective one. But then the 
purported content of mental ‘representations’ is rendered superfluous to the 
computations that comprise the ‘cognitive’ processes of cognitive science. 
The intended interpretation of internal syntax makes absolutely no differ-
ence to the formal mechanics of mind. 
2. THE CONNECTIONIST ALTERNATIVE
For a number of years now there has been a high profile struggle between 
opposing camps within the computational approach to the mind. In contrast 
to the classical paradigm derived from Turing, connectionist systems are 
based on networks of large numbers of simple but highly interconnected 
units that are brain-like in their inspiration. But according to Fodor (and 
Pylyshyn 1988), the brain-like architecture of connectionist networks tells 
us nothing about their suitability as models of cognitive processing, since it 
still leaves open the question of whether the mind is such a network at the 
representational level. He concedes that the connectionist approach may be 
the  right  type of  architecture  for  the medium of  implementation,  which 
would  mean  that  it  characterizes  a  level  below  that  of  genuine  mental 
structure. In view of the foregoing tension within the classical  paradigm 
concerning formal syntax and the inefficacy of content, I would argue that 
Fodor is on the wrong track when he insists that, within a computational 
approach, the representational level is fundamental. Instead, I would argue 
that the internal processing structures yielding the salient input/output pro-
files are all that matter, whether or not these are thought of as content bear-
ing. However, a number of connectionists have taken up Fodor’s challenge 
and  seek  out  ways  of  projecting  representational  content  onto  artificial 
neural networks. 
One comparatively recent such attempt (Churchland 1988, Laakso, 
A. and G. Cottrell 2000, O’Brien, G. and J. Opie 2001) uses cluster analys-
is to locate  ‘vehicles’  of representational  content  within artificial  neural 
networks, where such clusters serve as surrogates for the classical notion of 
internal syntax. Along with serious difficulties in equating clusters with the 
syntax of traditional computation, I would contend that such attempts suf-
fer  from exactly  the  same  built-in  tension  that  afflicts  the  LOT model; 
namely, the purported content for which the clusters serve as vehicles does 
no work in the processing path leading from inputs to outputs.  Just as in 
the  classical  case,  the  postulation  of  content  within  the  connectionist 
framework is gratuitous, because it plays no role in the cognitive manipula-
tion of inputs to yield the salient outputs. Indeed, if content weren’t gratuit-
ous, then computational versions of cognitive processing would be lament-
ably deficient in terms of their specification of the inputs. These are char-
acterized solely in formal or syntactical terms, and content is entirely ab-
sent  from the  external  stimuli  recognized  by the operations  that  can  be 
defined within the model. If representational content were at all relevant, 
then cognitive systems would have to process content itself. But according 
to computational methods, content is not specified with the input, nor does 
it play any efficacious role in internal processing. So, from a perspective 
that takes computation as the theoretical foundation for cognition, it seems 
quite retrograde to posit  content  on top of the factors that  do the actual 
work. Surely this is an ideal occasion for employing Ockham’s razor.
3. THE CHINESE ROOM ARGUMENT
Of  course,  John  Searle’s  (1980)  celebrated  Chinese  Room  Argument 
(henceforward  CRA)  runs  the  dialectic  in  exactly  the  reverse  direction: 
rather than taking the formal, syntactic nature of computation as a reason 
for  eschewing  content  in  a  properly  naturalistic  approach  to  the  mind, 
Searle instead takes it as a reason for rejecting computation as the appro-
priate theory of the mental. 
So, from the perspective of the present discussion, it is instructive to 
explicitly cast Searle’s argument in terms of the separability of syntactical 
structure from its intended meaning. In what follows I will abstract away 
from the somewhat picturesque details of Searle’s original version and ex-
press the logical core of the CRA via two premises and a conclusion:
(1) semantical content is an essential feature of the mind,
(2) syntactical manipulations cannot capture this content, therefore
(3) the mind cannot be reduced to a system of syntactical manipula-
tions.
Preimse (1) is an expression of the traditional conception of mentality, and 
is accepted by both Searle and by his opponents in orthodox cognitive sci-
ence and AI. As stated above, classical cognitive science and AI view the 
mind according to the model of rule governed symbol manipulation, and 
premise (1) is embraced insofar as the manipulated symbols are supposed 
to possess representational content. Searle’s dispute with cognitive science 
and AI centers on his rejection of the idea that internal computation can 
shed any real light on mental content, which leads to his conclusion (3), 
and to a concomitant dismissal of the research paradigm central to cognit-
ive science and AI. 
In response, a standard line for defenders of the paradigm is to try 
and defuse the CRA by arguing against premise (2), and claiming that the 
manipulated symbols really do possess some canonical meaning or priv-
ileged interpretation. However, I would urge that this is a strategic error for 
those who wish to defend the computational approach. As stated above, a 
distinguishing mathematical  virtue of computational  systems is precisely 
the fact  that  the formal  calculus  can be executed  without  any appeal  to 
meaning. Not only is an interpretation intrinsically unnecessary to the op-
eration of computational procedures,  but furthermore,  there is no unique 
interpretation determined by the computational syntax, and in general there 
are arbitrarily many distinct models for any given formal system. 
Many classical negative results in mathematical logic stem from this 
separability between formal syntax and meaning. The various upward and 
downward Löwenheim-Skolem theorems show that formal systems cannot 
capture intended meaning with respect to infinite cardinalities. As another 
eminent example, Gödel’s incompleteness theorems involve taking a form-
al system designed to be ‘about’ the natural numbers, and systematically 
reinterpreting it in terms of its own syntax and proof structure. As a con-
sequence of this ‘unintended’  interpretation,  Gödel  is able to prove that 
arithmetical truth, an exemplary semantical notion, cannot, in principle, be 
captured by finitary proof-theoretic means.
Computational  formalisms  are syntactically  closed systems,  and in 
this regard it is fitting to view them in narrow or solipsistic terms. They 
are, by their very nature, independent of the ‘external world’ of their inten-
ded meaning and, as mentioned above, they are incapable of capturing a 
unique interpretation, since they cannot distinguish between any number of 
alternative models. This can be encapsulated in the observation that the re-
lation  between  syntax  and semantics  is  fundamentally  one-to-many;  any 
given formal system will have arbitrarily many different interpretations (in 
the very strongest case, a ‘categorical’ theory can determine its models up 
to isomorphism). And this intrinsically one-to-many character obviates the 
possibility  of  deriving  or  even  attributing  a  unique  semantical  content 
merely on the basis of computational structure.
These (and a host of other) powerful results on the inherent limita-
tions of syntactical methods would seem to cast a rather deflationary light 
on the project of explicating mental content within a computational frame-
work.  Indeed, they would seem to render such goals as providing a com-
putational account of natural language semantics or propositional attitude 
states  profoundly  problematic.  Non-standard  models  exist  even for  such 
rigorously defined domains as first-order arithmetic and fully axiomatized 
geometry. And if the precise, artificial system of first-order arithmetic can-
not even impose isomorphism on its various models, how then could a pro-
gram, designed to process a specific natural language, say Chinese, supply 
a basis for the claim that the units of Chinese syntax posses a unique mean-
ing?
So I think that the advocates of computationalism make the wrong 
move by accepting Searle’s bait and taking on board the seemingly intract-
able  ‘symbol  grounding  problem’  that  results.  Instead  I  would  accept 
Searle’s negative premise (2) and agree that computation is too weak to un-
derwrite any interesting version of (1). Hence I would concur with Searle’s 
reasoning to the extent of accepting the salient conditional claim that if (1) 
is true then (3) is true as well. So the real crux of the issue lies in the truth-
value of (1), without which the consequent of the if-then statement cannot 
be detached as a free-standing conclusion. Only by accepting the tradition-
al,  a priori notion of mentality assumed in premise (1),  does (3) follow 
from the truth of (2). And it’s here that I would diverge from the views of 
both Searle and orthodox cognitive science.
4. CONSCIOUS PRESENTATION
In explicating and defending his pivotal premise (1), Searle (1990, 1992) 
again follows Brentano, in claiming that the human mind possesses origin-
al intentionality because it can experience conscious presentations of the 
objects that its representational states are ‘about’. Thus it is conscious ex-
perience that ultimately underwrites the intrinsic aboutness of genuine in-
tentional states. So Searle holds that consciousness supplies the basis for 
the truth of premise (1), and he further believes that consciousness arises 
from the specific causal powers of the brain considered as a physical struc-
ture, rather than via the implementation of some abstract ‘formal shadow’, 
be it  classical  or  connectionist.  Hence  intentionality  is  tethered  to brain 
processes via consciousness, and Searle thereby attempts to naturalize the 
traditional  notion  of  mentality,  while  at  the  same  time  discrediting  the 
computational paradigm, since he argues that computation has nothing to 
do with consciousness.
And while I would again agree with Searle’s view that consciousness 
arises  from physical  brain activities  rather  than from multiply realizable 
computational  structure,  I  would  nevertheless  argue,  contra  Searle,  that 
conscious experience, just like symbol manipulation, is too weak to under-
write any interesting version of tenet (1). With respect to the view that con-
scious experience is the cornerstone of intentionality, the CRA simply begs 
the question,  because it  presupposes that  the homunculus Searle,  replete 
with conscious presentations,  really does understand English in some spe-
cial way. Searle appeals to himself as the locus of genuine intentionality in 
the Chinese Room, and he would support this by citing the fact that he is 
consciously aware of the meanings of English expressions. For example, 
he can entertain a conscious image of the referent of the English string ‘h-
a-m-b-u-r-g-e-r’, while for him the strings of Chinese characters are com-
pletely devoid of conscious meanings. Ostensibly, this special understand-
ing  of  English  enables  him  to  follow  the  program  and  manipulate  the 
‘meaningless’ Chinese symbols. Hence lack of conscious presentation with 
respect to the semantics of Chinese constitutes the real asymmetry between 
the two languages,  and this underlies Searle’s claim that genuine under-
standing occurs in the case of one language and not the other. 
But this line of thought is not particularly compelling, since one can 
easily concede that Searle has episodes of conscious awareness which at-
tend his processing of English, while at the same time denying that these 
episodes are sufficient to establish intrinsic content, or to ground the se-
mantics of natural  language expressions.  Indeed, the mere occurrence of 
conscious presentations is too weak to even establish that they themselves 
play a role in Searle’s ability to follow the English instruction manual. In-
stead,  I  would  argue  that  what  consciousness  actually  provides  is  the 
foundation for the subjective impression, had by Searle and others, that the 
human mind enjoys some mysterious and seemingly magical form of inten-
tionality with the power to uniquely determine representational content. 
Thus when Searle contends that our mental states are ‘really about’ 
various external objects and states of affairs, this is merely an expression 
of the fact that, introspectively, it seems to us as if our mental states had 
some such special property. As argued in (Schweizer 1994), conscious ex-
perience is clearly sufficient to provide the source for this belief, since con-
scious experience intrinsic to how (some of) our mental states appear to us. 
But it cannot provide a basis for concluding that the belief is  true, unless 
consciousness is something much more mysterious and powerful than the 
resources of natural science can allow. Brentano famously dismissed natur-
alism,  and he  thereby  gave  himself  some  room for  the  claim that  con-
sciousness underwrites the mind’s essential intentionality. However, if one 
accepts naturalism and deems consciousness to be a phenomenon suppor-
ted by, say, the causal properties of electrochemical reactions taking place 
inside the skull, then one should just bite the bullet and accept that it is too 
weak to support Brentano’s thesis that intentionality is an essential feature 
of the mind.
It would be straying too far from the main goal of the article to ex-
pand on this latter claim at any great length, but considerations based on 
the ‘narrow’ status of consciousness should suffice to illustrate the central 
point. It is widely held by naturalistically inclined philosophers that psy-
chological states and properties must supervene upon occurrent,  internal, 
physical states and processes of organisms. This principle of ‘psychologic-
al autonomy’ should clearly apply to conscious states as well, and as a con-
sequence, factors outside the boundaries of an organism cannot affect con-
sciousness,  unless they make some relevant impact  on the occurrent,  in-
ternal  physical  states  and  processes  of  that  organism,  most  typically 
through inputs to the sensory mechanisms. But then the objection raised by 
Searle in the CRA against the computational paradigm comes back to un-
dermine his own position: the intrinsic relation between consciousness and 
its object becomes one-to-many, just as the relation between computational 
syntax and its interpretation is one-to-many. Any number of different, non-
standard, causes can yield exactly the same conscious experience (by indu-
cing exactly the same internal physical states and processes), just as a giv-
en formal system can have arbitrarily many distinct interpretations. 
Therefore conscious experience is, by its very nature, too weak to de-
termine a unique external object that one is conscious of. This problem is 
at the heart of Cartesian scepticism, and it still remains firmly entrenched 
within  the  narrow confines  of  naturalism.  According  to  Descartes  there 
could be any number of different  ‘causal’  circumstances correlated with 
the same conscious state, and he therefore entertained a very radical ver-
sion of the one-to-many problem, in which even a malignant demon could 
not be ruled out as a non-standard model. In a more contemporary guise, 
Putnam’s (1981) celebrated brains-in-a-vat argument exploits this solipsist-
ic feature to show that conscious psychological states are too weak to cap-
ture the semantics of natural language. 
5. REPRESENTATION AS HEURISTICS
There have been a number of high profile positions advanced in negative 
reaction to ‘traditional’ cognitive science that take anti-representationalism 
as one their hallmarks, including dynamical systems theory (e.g Van Geld-
er 1996), behaviour based robotics (e.g. Brooks 1996), approaches utilizing 
sensory-motor affordances (e.g. Noё 2004), and some varieties of connec-
tionism (that deliberately refuse Fodor’s challenge).  A common factor is 
that  these  views  all  advance  some  version  of  the  slogan  ‘intelligence 
without representation’.  In order to locate my position on the salient philo-
sophical landscape, it is worth noting that it is not anti-representational in 
this sense. On my view, there could well be internal structures that play 
many of the roles that people would ordinarily expect of representations, 
and this is especially true at the level of perception, sensory-motor control 
and navigation. So I would be quite happy to accept things like spatial en-
codings, somatic emulators, internal mirrorings of relevant aspects of the 
external environment. Ultimately this boils down to questions that must be 
settled empirically in the case of biologically induced agents, but unlike the 
anti-representationalists, I do not deny that the most plausible form of cog-
nitive architecture may well  incorporate internal  structures and stand-ins 
that many people would be tempted to call ‘representations’. 
But I would argue that this label should be construed purely in a weak, 
operational sense, and should not be conflated with the more robust tradi-
tional conception. To the extent that internal structures can encode, mirror 
or model external  objects and states of affairs,  they do so via their own 
causal and/or syntactic properties. And again, to the extent that they influ-
ence behaviour or the internal processing of inputs to yield outputs, they do 
this solely in virtue of their  causal  and/or  syntactic  attributes.   There is 
nothing  about  these  internal  structures  that  could  support  Searle’s  or 
Brentano’s notion of original intentionality, and there is no independent or 
objective fact of the matter regarding their ‘real’ content or meaning. 
And similarly, my view is not eliminativist in the sense of Churchland 
(1981), because, just as in the case of low level activities such as sensation, 
navigation and motor control, so too in the case of higher level activities 
such as rational deliberation and the interaction of propositional attitudes – 
my position is not based on conjectures about the non-existence of various 
internal elements as revealed by future scientific research. Maybe it will 
turn out to be a theoretically fruitful level of description to view the brain 
as implementing a full blown system of recursive syntax. So, I would not 
deny, in advance of weighty empirical  evidence,  that  there  may even be 
processing structures that play the role of Fodor’s belief and desire boxes, 
internal sentences, etc. (although I would find this rather surprising). So I 
would not at this point rule out the possibility that there may be some type 
of operational reduction of traditional psychological concepts to functional 
or  neurophysiological  states  that  could  prove useful  in  predicting  beha-
viour (see Schweizer 2001 for more discussion). Instead, my point is that 
even if there were such neural structures implementing an internal LOT, 
this still wouldn’t ground traditional semantics and genuine aboutness. As 
will be argued in more detail  in the next section, these structures would 
have the relevant causal/syntatctic properties but not the semantic ones. 
So what I deny is not that there may be internal mechanisms that re-
flect external properties and states of affairs in systematic and biologically 
useful ways. Instead I would deny that there is anything more to this phe-
nomenon  than  highly  sensitive  and  evolved  relations  of  calibration 
between the internal workings of an organism and its specialized environ-
mental  context.  Evolutionary history can be invoked to yield interesting 
heuristics with respect to these mechanical relations of calibration, and per-
haps support counterfactuals regarding their role in the organism’s adapt-
ive success. But evolution is based on random mutation, and natural ‘selec-
tion’ is an equally purposeless mechanism. Neither can provide the theoret-
ical resources sufficient to ground the strong traditional notion of ‘genuine 
aboutness’.
Thus if I had to coin a competing slogan to encapsulate my own pos-
ition, it would be something like ‘representation without intentionality’. If 
one is truly committed to naturalism, then there is only a difference of de-
gree and complexity but not in kind between, say, the reflection of moon-
light in a pond and the retinal image of the moon in some organism’s visu-
al system. Proponents of the orthodox view are inclined to think that a suf-
ficient difference in degree and complexity somehow yields an esoteric dif-
ference in kind, a difference that allows us to cross the conceptual bound-
ary from mere causal correlations to ‘genuine aboutness’. But I would con-
tend that naturalism itself supplies an asymptotic limit for this curve, and 
that the boundary can be crossed only by invoking non-natural factors.
6. BEHAVIOR VERSUS MEANING
The considerations presented so far have been motivated within the frame-
work of a computational approach to the mind. But mental processes and 
natural language semantics clearly have many intimate philosophical con-
nections,  and the foregoing one-to-many relation underlying  the  symbol 
grounding problem has well known consequences for the linguistic theory 
of meaning. If one accepts the allied principle of psychological autonomy, 
then it  follows that  the mind is too weak to determine what  its  internal 
components are ‘really about’, and this extends to the case of expressions 
in natural language as well. The famed conclusion of Putnam’s Twin Earth 
argument (Putnam 1975) is that “meanings ain’t in the head”, and this is 
because narrow psychological states are incapable of determining the refer-
ence relation for terms in our public languages.  But rather than abandon 
natural  language  semantics  in light  of  the problem,  the externalist  quite 
rightly abandons the traditional idea that the intentionality of mental states 
provides the foundation for linguistic reference. 
Putnam’s strategy is to directly invoke external circumstances in the 
characterization  of  meaning  for  natural  languages.  The  externalist  ap-
proach exploits direct,  ostensive access to the world, thus circumventing 
the difficulty by relieving mental states of their referential burden. On such 
an approach, the object of reference can only be specified by indexical ap-
peal to the object itself,  and in principle it  cannot  be determined merely 
from the psychological states of the language user. Direct appeal to the ac-
tual environment and linguistic community in which the cognitive agent is 
situated then plays the principal role in determining the match-up between 
language and world. Putnam’s strategy offers a viable account of linguistic 
reference  precisely because it transgresses the boundaries of the mind in-
trinsic to the explanatory project of cognitive science. The externalist must 
invoke broad environmental factors, since nothing internal to a cognitive 
system is capable of uniquely capturing the purported ‘content’ of its rep-
resentations  and  thereby  semantically  grounding  its  internal  states.  And 
from this it follows that original content is not a property of the representa-
tion qua cognitive structure, and hence it is not the cognitive structure itself 
that provides the theoretical basis for meaning. Indeed, outside factors then 
do the real work, and the purported semantical aspect of internal configura-
tions is trivialized.
However, in normal, everyday practice, we continually use sentences 
of public language to ascribe various content bearing mental states, both to 
ourselves and others, and it is here that a potential confusion arises. A de-
fender of the tradition might argue that the truth of such ascriptions shows 
that there is still a legitimate fact of the matter regarding mental content, 
and hence  that  there  is  an objective  match-up problem remaining to  be 
solved. When an agent is correctly attributed a given propositional attitude, 
such as the belief that  ϕ , this captures an actual feature of their doxastic 
configuration and must be supported by some corresponding aspect of their 
internal make up. 
At this point I do not wish to become embroiled in the ‘Folk Psycho-
logy’ debate, but in terms of the present discussion it is important to note 
that such a line of argument makes an unwarranted extrapolation from our 
common sense practices, because the age-old customs of folk psychology 
are independent of any assumptions about internal symbols, states or struc-
tures.  Observable  behavior  and context  are the relevant  criteria,  and the 
truth-conditions for such ascriptions are founded on external, macroscopic 
and operational considerations. As in everyday life, one can use behavioral 
and environmental  factors  to adduce  that,  say,  Jones  believes  that  lager 
quenches thirst, but this practice makes no assumptions about the nature or 
even  existence  of  an  internal  representation  encoding  the  propositional 
content of the belief . The attribution concerns Jones as an unanalyzed unit, 
a black box whose actions take place within a particular environmental and 
linguistic setting. It gives no handle whatever on postulating hidden intern-
al cogs and levers that generate Jones’ actions, and it’s perfectly compat-
ible with an agnostic disregard of such inner workings.
At this stage, an ardent representationalist is likely to invoke the be-
lief-desire framework of psychological explanation to defend a realist ac-
count of internal meaning. As mentioned at the start of the paper, not only 
do we ascribe various content bearing states to ourselves and others, but 
furthermore we habitually use such ascriptions to explain and successfully 
predict behavior. According to this widely accepted framework, psycholo-
gical states individuated in terms of their  content, such as beliefs and de-
sires, are causally responsible for a host of rational actions. Hence, it might 
be argued, the belief-desire framework can successfully predict  behavior 
from the outside, precisely because it mirrors the internal processing struc-
ture that causes the behavior.
Thus when, from the outside, we justifiably ascribe to Jones the be-
lief that lager quenches thirst,  Fodor would have it that a token of some 
mentalese sentence,  say ‘n%^7 £#~ %&!+’, which encodes the same se-
mantical content as the English ascription, has been duly etched into her 
‘belief  box’.  This  physical  implementation  of  mentalese  syntax  is  then 
poised to interact with other physically implemented tokens in her desire 
box to produce assorted forms of rational action, such as standing up and 
reaching  for  a  pint.  In  this  manner,  the  truth  of  propositional  attitude 
ascriptions is directly correlated with salient internal configurations of the 
agent.
But this purported correlation breaks down at its most vital point – 
the level of semantical content. For the story to work, the sentences ‘lager 
quenches thirst’ and ‘n%^7 £#~ %&!+’ must both express the same pro-
position.  Yet  as  a  medium of  classical  computation,  the  LOT is  just  a 
scheme for rule governed symbol manipulation. Syntax churning within a 
formal  system is fundamentally  different  from the operation of a public 
language, and it is a significant conflation to impute to the former the same 
semantical properties conventionally attributed to the latter. English is ac-
quired and exercised in an inter-subjectively accessible context with which 
the  entire  sociolinguistic  community  has  indexical  contact.  There  are 
shared criteria  for the correct  use of natural  language sentences  and the 
rules under which various expressions are deployed, and there are direct, 
ostensive ties between publicly produced syntactic tokens and their refer-
ents. In vivid contrast, there are no such shared criteria nor public ties for 
the hidden, internal sentences of mentalese. The LOT serves as an extreme 
example of a private language (Wittgenstein, 1953), and as such it has no 
communal  truth conditions nor standard semantic  properties.  Indeed,  the 
LOT is so private it’s even hidden from the introspective awareness of the 
individual agent, and it thereby also eludes Searle’s traditional association 
of linguistic meaning with agent-based intentionality.
As elements in a formal system, there is no fact of the matter con-
cerning what  the internal  sentences of mentalese  ‘really mean’.  At best, 
these conjectured tokens of computational syntax would successfully gov-
ern our behavior in familiar surroundings, but they would fail to do so if 
we were placed in radically different  circumstances.  So they are merely 
calibrated with the environment in which they happened to develop, and 
this historical fact is not sufficient to  imbue them with objective content. 
To the extent that these hypothetical symbols successfully govern behavi-
or, they do so purely in terms of their formal, syntactical properties, and as 
noted before, there is no work left to be done by their intended interpreta-
tion. On a computational approach to the mind, it is processing structure 
and not semantics that is the cause of human action.  
So at this point a wedge must be driven between two apparently re-
lated but nonetheless quite distinct theoretical projects. There is very signi-
ficant difference between a theory of natural language semantics and a psy-
chological theory regarding the internal states causally responsible for our 
input/output profiles. The former is an idealized and normative endeavor, 
concerned with articulating high level characterizations which reflect the 
socially  agreed  truth-conditions  for  sentences  in  a  public  language.  As 
such, this endeavour has no direct bearing on an essentially descriptive ac-
count of the internal mechanisms responsible for processing cognitive in-
puts and yielding various behavioural outputs, even when we consider the 
production of verbal behaviour, or the common sense attribution of various 
propositional attitude states using natural language. 
Hence  I  would  diagnose  the  classical  Fodorian  effort  to  build  se-
mantical  content  into  a computational  theory  of mind as  an infelicitous 
failure to separate these two projects at exactly the point where they should 
not coalesce.  The infelicity of this move is already apparent in Psychose-
mantics,  where  Fodor  (1987)  tries  to address  the notorious  problems  of 
wide versus narrow content introduced by Putnam and later Burge (1979). 
In an attempt to defend his narrow version of content against Twin Earth 
objections, Fodor is forced to claim that “… what my water-thoughts share 
with Twin ‘water’-thoughts isn’t content. Narrow content is radically inex-
pressible,  because it’s only content  potentially;” (p. 50). But this sounds 
uncomfortably close to equivocation, and invites the question – why call it 
‘content’ at all? Fodor goes on to say that “a narrow content is essentially a 
function from contexts onto truth conditions;” (p. 53), so that in the context 
of Earth this  function yields  thoughts  about  H2O, and on Twin Earth it 
yields thoughts about XYZ. He states that this abstract function is imple-
mented in the human brain, whereby it enjoys causal efficacy in the phys-
ical world. But it’s crucial to note that the distinguishing characteristics of 
such abstruse functions are woefully underspecified by the brute facts of 
physical brain structure and natural selection. Mere terrestrial teleology is 
one thing, but how on earth could biological evolution select a function de-
signed to yield XYZ thoughts on another planet? 
This account appears to be a strained attempt to appropriate and in-
ternalize a normative, idealized position in the theory of natural language 
semantics,  rather  than  to  provide  a  naturalistically  plausible  story  about 
cognitive processing. Instead of narrow ‘content’, what such Twins have in 
common is the same internal processing structure,  and this produces the 
same outputs when given the same inputs, regardless of the input’s distal 
source in the environment. In contrast to Fodor’s claim quoted above con-
cerning the essential  nature of narrow content, the proper domain of the 
implemented cognitive function is inputs and not contexts, and this is pre-
cisely why individual  cognitive systems cannot capture the semantics  of 
public languages.
7. CONCLUSION
According to the position advocated herein, the traditional commitment to 
representational  content constitutes a retrograde step within the context of 
naturalistic explanation. The crucial point to notice is that internal ‘repres-
entations’ do all their scientifically tangible cognitive work solely in virtue 
of  their  physical/formal/mathematical  structure.  There  is  nothing  about 
them, qua efficacious elements of internal processing, that is ‘about’ any-
thing else. Content is not an explicit component of the input, nor is it acted 
upon  or  transformed  via  cognitive  computations.  All  that  is  explicitly 
present and causally relevant are computational structure plus supporting 
physical mechanisms, which is exactly what one would expect from a nat-
uralistic account. 
In order for cognitive structures to do their job, there is no need to 
posit some additional ‘content’, ‘semantical value’, or ‘external referent’. 
Such representation talk may serve a useful heuristic role, but it remains a 
conventional, observer-relative ascription, and accordingly there’s no inde-
pendent fact of the matter, and so there isn’t a sense in which it’s possible 
to go wrong or be mistaken about what an internal configuration is ‘really’ 
about. Instead, representational content can be projected onto an internal 
structure when this type of gloss plays an opportune role in characterizing 
the  overall  processing  activities  which  govern  the  system’s  interactions 
with its environment, and hence in predicting its salient input/output pat-
terns. But it is simply a matter of convenience, convention and choice, and 
does not reveal an underlying fact of the matter nor any essential character-
istics of the system.
 From the point of view of the system, these internal structures are 
manipulated directly, and the notion that they are ‘directed towards’ some-
thing else plays no role in the pathways leading from cognitive inputs to 
intelligent outputs. Hence the symbol grounding problem is a red herring – 
it isn’t necessary to quest after some elusive and mysterious layer of ‘real’ 
content,  for  which  these  internal  structures  serve  as  the  mere  syntactic 
vehicle. Syntactical and physical processes are all we have, and their effic-
acy  is  not  affected  by the purported  presence  or absence  of meaning.  I 
would argue that the computational paradigm is thematically inconsistent 
with the search for content or its supposed ‘vehicles’. Instead, the concern 
of  computational  models  of  cognition  should  be  with  the  internal  pro-
cessing structures that  yield the right  kinds of input/output  profiles  of a 
system embedded in a particular environmental context, and with how such 
processing structures are implemented in the system’s physical machinery. 
These are the factors that do the work and are sufficient to explain all of 
the empirical data, and they do this using the normal theoretical resources 
of natural science. Indeed, the postulation of content as the essential fea-
ture distinguishing mental from non-mental systems should be seen as the 
last remaining vestige of Cartesian dualism, and, contra Fodor, naturalized 
cognition has no place for a semantical  ‘ghost in the machine’.  When it 
comes to computation and content, only the vehicle is required, not the ex-
cess baggage.
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